INSTRUMENT RATING 10 / LEARN · EXPLORE · CHECK
Recognizing instrument failures
Recognize suspect indications, trace shared failures and organize the initial control, checklist and communication priorities.
Your learning goals
- Recognize conflicting indications or failure annunciations.
- Use independent evidence to identify a suspect source without assuming every display is independent.
- Describe initial control, communication, and checklist priorities.
Start with the flight condition you should observe
Failure recognition starts with knowing normal indications. After a control or power change, compare the expected attitude and performance with what the instruments show. A gradual trend, a frozen value, an implausible jump, missing information or a failure annunciation can identify a problem. A discrepancy does not automatically identify which instrument is wrong.
For a normal coordinated turn, bank, turn rate and heading change should have a sensible relationship. For a climb, attitude and power must be consistent with airspeed and increasing altitude; a conventional VSI may lag before settling. An altimeter setting change or alternate-static selection can change indications without matching aircraft motion. Consider those known normal effects before assigning a fault.
Avoid fixation: staring at the instrument that looks wrong while aircraft control drifts. Expand the relevant cross-check, maintain control with corroborated information and reduce competing tasks. Do not make a large control change merely to satisfy one conflicting indication or a bodily sensation.
IFH 11-7: analog instrument failure · IFH 6-10–6-12: cross-check, interpretation and errors
Compare relevant evidence, not votes
Ask what each indication measures and which sources it shares. A display can be electrically separate but use the same sensor, or have a separate attitude sensor but share the main electrical supply. A standby airspeed indicator may be independent of the ADC yet share the blocked pitot/static plumbing. Independence must be evaluated for the particular suspected failure.
Use a combination that is relevant to the disagreement. A verified independent attitude reference is direct attitude evidence. Turn-rate and heading trends help assess bank/turn; airspeed, altitude and vertical-speed trends help assess pitch/performance. None of those individually supplies every piece of missing attitude information. GPS track and groundspeed add context but do not equal magnetic heading or indicated airspeed.
Do not use a majority vote from three indications supplied by one failed source. Conversely, the odd-one-out display is not necessarily wrong merely because two others agree. Combine the system map, source status, expected response and corroborating trends. If evidence remains inconclusive, treat the disputed data as suspect and use the aircraft's unreliable-data or failure guidance.
IFH 5-22–5-23: AHRS and ADC · IFH 11-7–11-8: cross-check during failure
Recognize patterns that suggest a common source
The following are clues for source reasoning, not final diagnoses or switch instructions. Partial blockages, intermittent wiring and processing faults may produce different combinations. Verify the actual installation and preserve aircraft control while checking the evidence.
| Observed pattern | Possible relationship | Useful verification |
|---|---|---|
| Vacuum-driven attitude and heading drift together | A common pneumatic source may be failing as gyros slow. | Source gauge/warning, installed gyro power map and independent turn/attitude evidence. |
| Altitude freezes, VSI settles to zero, IAS becomes inconsistent after an altitude change | A shared static-source blockage is plausible. | Which plumbing/ADC/standby uses that static source; alternate-static procedure and expected errors. |
| Two electronic attitude/heading presentations disagree with a verified separate standby | A common AHRS or its inputs/data path may affect both main displays. | Source-selection and validity messages, actual sensor sharing, and relevant performance trends. |
| A screen goes blank but another still displays valid data | A screen or its supply/path may have failed while sensors remain usable. | Published display-failure/reversion procedure and remaining data/source status. |
| Low-voltage/charging alert with screens still lit | The battery may be supporting loads after charging-source loss. | Electrical indicators, approved checklist and which equipment remains on each available supply. |
Do not assume the engine has stopped because a charging alert appears. A conventional magneto-ignition engine may keep running after electrical-system loss, while an electrically dependent installation has different consequences. Likewise, a moving horizon does not prove adequate power, and a working radio does not prove a healthy alternator.
An AFCS or flight director using a suspect source may produce erroneous commands. Its apparent ability to hold something is not independent validation. Determine whether its sensors remain reliable and apply its published malfunction or disconnect guidance.
IFH 11-5–11-8: charging, analog, pneumatic and pitot/static failures · IFH 5-25–5-26: autopilot sensor dependencies
Inaccurate information may still look alive
An inoperative instrument may be blank, have an explicit failure flag, or no longer supply usable information. An inaccurate instrument may continue showing plausible numbers or a moving horizon. Both can be unsafe to use for the affected task. A self-test or an unflagged display does not prove that every supporting input is correct.
Know the meaning of the installed flags and messages. A red cross, off flag, source-disagreement message, invalid-data label or mode loss can apply to particular information rather than the entire display. Read the text and affected area, then follow the applicable procedure. Annunciations and colors are installation-specific; this lesson does not define one universal failure symbol.
When a navigation indication becomes unreliable, verify the selected source, signal/position status and active leg before attributing everything to a screen. GPS/GNSS disruption can affect position information even when a map remains visually plausible. Comparing two maps fed by the same navigator supplies no independent position confirmation. Use available independent navigation evidence and advise ATC if the equipment loss affects compliance; detailed navigation alternatives follow in later lessons.
Do not “clear” a warning by dismissing it and assume the underlying condition has gone away. Record what it said and reassess the source and aircraft response. A returning display after a reset still requires the checks and limitations prescribed by its manufacturer.
IFH 11-7: inaccurate and inoperative instrument recognition · AIM 1-1-13: user reports requested on NAVAID or GPS performance/anomalies
Keep control while reducing the task load
When a discrepancy appears, first preserve aircraft control using the reliable references you have identified. Continue the cross-check and keep airspeed, altitude and direction under observation. Do not let diagnosing the exact component take priority over a stable flight condition. If a real upset has developed, use the aircraft and instructor-taught recovery procedures; this is not a recovery tutorial.
- ControlUse corroborated information and check the resulting performance.
- SimplifyReduce programming and other competing tasks; assess suspect automation.
- Use the checklistApply the appropriate published procedure and communicate needed assistance.
Identify the information or source that appears unreliable, then use the appropriate checklist as workload permits. Use an installed standby or approved alternate according to its procedure and limitations. A familiar label or a separate screen is not enough: verify its data and power. If erroneous automation is contributing to the problem, act under its malfunction/disconnect procedure while maintaining control.
Do not attempt continued IFR operation merely because some equipment remains illuminated. Reassess the available control and navigation capability, weather, terrain and workload with the aircraft procedures. Tell ATC when equipment trouble affects clearance compliance and request the assistance needed. The later partial-panel lesson develops reduced-instrument control and approaches; the emergency-decisions lesson develops diversion and landing choices.
IFH 11-7–11-8: maintaining control, checklists and ATC · ACS VII.D: recognition, control and distraction risks
Restoring power is not automatically a safe fix
Use the applicable AFM/POH and approved supplements for alternate-static selection, standby activation, display reversion, source switching and electrical load management. Do not import another aircraft's sequence, promised battery endurance or bus assignment. A source switch can introduce different errors or remove other capabilities, so check the resulting indications and remaining information.
Do not pull or reset circuit breakers as a general troubleshooting routine. Circuit protection may be responding to a genuine electrical fault; reenergizing it can produce heat or fire. Follow explicit approved procedures and their restrictions, and do not repeatedly reset a tripping breaker. Smoke, burning odor or unusual heat requires the applicable smoke/fire response rather than an improvised attempt to restore a display.
In ground preparation, locate the relevant checklists and have an instructor explain the allowed fault-isolation actions. Practice failures with appropriate instructor-directed simulation rather than disabling live aircraft systems casually. Write down the first warning, affected data and response to any authorized action so that repeated resets or screen changes do not erase the evidence.
Common error: assuming that bringing a display back proves the fault is repaired or that an alternate source is now error-free. A restored indication is usable only within the manufacturer's checks, validity indications and operating limitations.
IFH 11-4–11-8: display, power and alternate sources · FAA SAIB CE-10-11: fire hazard and approved-procedure cautions for circuit breakers · Current FAA Glider Flying Handbook 8-23: circuit-breaker fire caution, citing CE-10-11R1
Describe the effect and preserve a useful record
As workload permits, advise ATC of the equipment problem and what it prevents you from doing. “Primary attitude indication unreliable; using standby; unable assigned turn for now” communicates more useful information than a speculative component diagnosis. State the actual situation and request appropriate assistance; do not wait for certainty about a circuit board before reporting a capability loss.
A source failure can also affect altitude reporting, navigation or communications through shared power or data. If ATC reports an altitude discrepancy, check the altimeter setting, source dependencies and applicable procedure rather than changing altitude merely to make a reported number match. Explain the observed discrepancy and preserve safe control using reliable information.
After flight, record the warning text, phase of flight, conditions, values/trends, equipment affected and checklist actions. A report such as “heading display stuck at 210° during taxi, source message displayed, persisted after prescribed check” is more useful than “avionics bad.” Maintenance and required airworthiness decisions must be resolved before subsequent operation under the applicable requirements.
For this lesson, success means explaining which evidence is reliable and what initial priorities follow. It does not establish the skill to fly a partial-panel approach or make every emergency landing decision. Those require later ground study and instructor-led flight practice.
ACS VII.D.K1/K2 and R1/R2/R3: recognition, ATC, secondary displays and priorities · IFH 11-7–11-8: communication and system failure
FLIGHT SCENARIO
What would change your plan?
In a fictional simulator, both main displays slowly show increasing bank, but they share one AHRS. A separately powered standby attitude unit with verified independent sensors supports level flight; independent turn and pressure-based trends support that assessment. The autopilot uses the suspect AHRS, and a source-disagreement message appears. Explain which agreement is useful evidence, what automation risk follows, and how to reduce workload and communicate the limitation.
- NoticeWhat does this situation require?
- VerifyWhat evidence is still missing?
- DecideWhat keeps an option open?
Compare your reasoning
Agreement between the two main displays is one shared-source observation, not independent confirmation. The verified standby and relevant turn/performance trends provide stronger corroboration in this scenario. Maintain control with reliable information, apply the AFCS malfunction/disconnect guidance and the aircraft failure checklist, and reduce competing tasks. Advise ATC of the capability loss and assistance needed. Do not chase a suspect display, invent a switching sequence, or reset breakers as a routine fix.
SUMMARY
Keep control with corroborated evidence while identifying the unreliable source.
Agreement between the two main displays is one shared-source observation, not independent confirmation. The verified standby and relevant turn/performance trends provide stronger corroboration in this scenario. Maintain control with reliable information, apply the AFCS malfunction/disconnect guidance and the aircraft failure checklist, and reduce competing tasks. Advise ATC of the capability loss and assistance needed. Do not chase a suspect display, invent a switching sequence, or reset breakers as a routine fix.
Before moving on, explain the decision in your own words: what would you verify, and what would make you change the plan?
PRACTICE
Flashcards and knowledge check
12 flashcards, then 10 questions with explanations.
Enable JavaScript for flashcards and the knowledge check. The lesson and scenario remain available without it.
Sources & lesson notes
Sources & lesson notes
- IFH FAA-H-8083-15B: printed 11-4–11-8; 5-22–5-26; 6-10–6-12Actual failure chapter is Chapter 11: electronic displays, charging-source, analog, pneumatic and pitot/static failures. Source and cross-check principles support recognition. Aircraft examples do not supply universal switching procedures or battery endurance.
- Current AIM 1-1-13: NAVAID and GPS anomaliesRecognizing/reporting navigation discrepancies and the possibility of visually plausible erroneous position; verified October 8, 2026.
- FAA SAIB CE-10-11, December 23, 2009: electrical fire hazardBackground and approved-procedure cautions concerning routine circuit-breaker resets. This historical bulletin was revised as CE-10-11R1; no timing/reset sequence from it is prescribed by this lesson.
- Current FAA Glider Flying Handbook, printed 8-23, citing CE-10-11R1Current FAA statement of circuit-breaker fire risk and avoiding resets with smoke/burning smell. Cited for the electrical-protection hazard only; use this airplane’s approved emergency procedures.
- FAA-S-ACS-8C: VII.D (printed 22–23), II.B (6–7), IV.A (10)Assigned recognition/mitigation knowledge and control/secondary-display/distraction risks. No partial-panel approach skill is taught or assessed here.
- FAA handbook register and aircraft-specific lesson noteChecked October 8, 2026. No aircraft-specific manual has been supplied. Source switching, reversion, AFCS, electrical and smoke/fire actions require the applicable AFM/POH and approved supplements.
For U.S. single-engine airplane instrument study. Official sources checked October 8, 2026; eCFR displayed Title 14 current through October 6, 2026. Use current publications and the applicable aircraft AFM/POH and avionics supplements. These lessons support ground study and do not replace required instruction, endorsements, experience, or tests.
ACS study associations
These associations identify the concepts taught here. Skill elements describe preparation for instructor-led flight training; reading or completing this lesson does not demonstrate flight proficiency.
- IR.IV.A.K3 — Distinguishes normal lag/reference changes from abnormal or implausible indications.
- IR.VII.D.K1 — Teaches inaccurate versus inoperative recognition and reporting affected capability to ATC.
- IR.VII.D.K2 — Explains common sensor/source failures and initial mitigation under published procedures; detailed approach operation follows later.
- IR.II.B.R3 — Addresses failure modes, suspect-source automation and unjustified reset/restoration assumptions.
- IR.VII.D.R1 — Assesses secondary-display relevance, availability and source independence before reliance.
- IR.VII.D.R2 — Prioritizes aircraft control with reliable references while recognition and diagnosis proceed.
- IR.VII.D.R3 — Addresses fixation, workload, loss of awareness and delayed capability communication.